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Abstract We present a comprehensive experimental design that makes it possible to
characterize other-regarding preferences and their relationship to the decision maker’s
relative position. Participants are facedwith a large number of decisions involving vari-
ations in the trade-offs between own and other’s payoffs, as well as in other potentially
important factors like the decision maker’s relative position. We find that: (1) choices
are responsive to the cost of helping and hurting others; (2) The weight a decision
maker places on others’ monetary payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is
in an advantageous or disadvantageous relative position; and (3) We find no evidence
of reciprocity of the type linked to menu-dependence. The results of a mixture-model
estimation show considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations and confirm the
absence of reciprocal motives. Pure selfish behavior is the most frequently observed
behavior. Among the subjects exhibiting social preferences, social-welfare maximiza-
tion is the most frequent, followed by inequality-aversion and by competitiveness.
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1 Introduction
Studies of social preferences in economics have demonstrated that decision makers
consider the welfare of others. Much of the initial scholarly debate focused on what
kind of utility specification was most appropriate for characterizing people’s average
behavior. The specific motives explored in the literature can be roughly classified into
altruistic preferences (Andreoni et al. 2008), distributional preferences (Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999), and reciprocal preferences (Charness and
Rabin 2002; Falk andFischbacher 2006).Altruistic preferences involve aweight on the
others’ payoffs, distributional preferences typically involve a penalty on the distance
from some equitable reference point, and reciprocal preferences are conditional on
actions by others.
Extant studies of people’s pro-social behavior have looked at relatively few deci-
sions by each individual and established models of social preferences have been
informed by this kind of aggregate information. However, some of themore recent evi-
dence has shown that individualmotivations are quite heterogeneous. This is important
from a positive point of view, since aggregate behavior often needs to be understood
in terms of the interaction of agents with different kinds of social preferences. To bet-
ter understand heterogeneity is also important from a normative standpoint. Fairness
ideals can be expected to be diverse and to understand public debates on distributive
justice one needs to have information about this diversity. As Almas et al. (2010)
put it, “most adults believe that differences in individual achievements and efficiency
considerations […] may justify an unequal distribution of income”. But, they disagree
on which unequal distributions they consider to be fair. From a normative point of
view, understanding the heterogeneity of preferences and views may help to get a
better understanding of the sources of these disagreements. Cappelen et al. (2007)
analyze how views on fairness ideals depend on individual characteristics, includ-
ing talent and disposition to effort. Konow (2009) documents the existence of large
variance in fairness ideals in a realistic experiment in which the diversity of moral
judgments is sensible to the manipulation of information conditions in the labora-
tory.
For both positive and normative reasons it is, therefore, necessary to generate infor-
mation that directly pertains to individuals’ social preferences. Experiments make it
possible to generate rich data sets of this kind and this can yield important advantages in
some cases. Some previous studies collect such data sets. Brandts and Schram (2001)
study a public good environment inwhich subjects have tomake contribution decisions
for 10 different relative prices of a private and public good. This yields a complete
‘contribution function’ for each subject and makes it possible to reject in a simple way
the long-lived hypothesis that subjects contribute positive amounts only by mistake.
In Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) subjects are asked to choose between alternative
states with different uniform income distributions. Through choices between alterna-
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tive states they obtain information about participants’ degree of relative risk aversion
and the degree of positionality (the concern for relative standing).
Andreoni and Miller (2002) ask whether experimental subjects’ concern for altru-
ism or fairness can be expressed as a well-behaved preference ordering. They had
their subjects make between 8 and 16 dictator-type allocation decisions in which they
distributed tokens between themselves and another person. Each of these involved a
given endowment of tokens as well as an own payoff from keeping a token and a payoff
to the other from giving a token to the other. Of these situations 11 involved a token
endowment, a positive value to the decision-maker of keeping each token and a posi-
tive value (for the other person) of each of the tokens being passed to him or her. These
eleven situations involved five different levels of token endowments and seven differ-
ent values for the relative price of giving. The other five situations effectively involved
budget constraints that sloped up—people could spend tokens on taking tokens away
from others—with the aim of finding out about the importance of what the authors call
“rational jealousy”. This design makes it possible to obtain a broad picture of behavior
and to study the consistency of behavior in their context. Andreoni and Miller (2002)
report that a large part of their subjects’ decisions can be represented by three kinds
of simple distributional preferences: purely selfish, Leontief and perfect substitutes
preferences.1
Blanco et al. (2011) study the behavior of subjects that play the ultimatum game,
the dictator game, a sequential prisoner’s dilemma and a public good game. Their data
show that inequality aversion has good predictive power at the aggregate level but
performs less well at the individual level. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2013) ask for actions
over sixteenmodified dictator games with three possible choices each and elicit beliefs
about other subjects’ actions in the same task; their focus is on the correlation between
actions and beliefs and the impact of social information. They report that subjects
with different interdependent preferences have indeed different beliefs about others’
actions.
Cappelen et al. (2011) use a multi-stage dictator game where the donation is pre-
ceded by a production stage in which dictators had to invest their endowment to obtain
a (high or low) return. They obtain information about subjects’ social preferences from
a standard experiment with real stakes and self-reported information on fairness ideals
coming from surveys. Relative to a base experimental condition (theB-treatment), they
prime different fairness rules in their E-treatment and find a persistent heterogeneity
of subjects’ ideals across information conditions and experimental methods (with real
stakes or using self-reported data).
In this work, we attempt to measure the impact both qualitative and quantitative of
these three basic factors. First, through a series of different binary choices we elicit
whether subjects are willing—and to what extent—to increase or decrease others’
payoffs at different costs to their own payoffs. Second, we study how such decisions
depend on whether the decision maker is in an advantageous or disadvantageous
position. Third, we study whether these same subjects modify their willingness to
sacrifice depending on whether another subject has foregone various types of outside
1 Fisman et al. (2007) go further and allow for three-person dictator games. This makes it possible to
distinguish between behavior that is compatible with well-behaved preferences and behavior that is not.
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options (reciprocity). In this way, we present a joint analysis of the importance of
distributional aspects linked only to payoffs and of reciprocity influences of the kind
related to menu-dependence.2
In our experiments, each of our participants has to make numerous sequential pair-
wise choices between two alternative states described only by payoffs to himself and to
another person. In designing these choice problems we were guided by what previous
experimental and modeling studies have identified as some of the basic influences
that need to be taken into account when dealing with interdependent motivation. The
first of these is that many people care about the payoffs of others in several respects.
People may care about the relation of their own payoffs to those of others, about
the sum of payoffs to all involved, as well as about other payoff-related aspects. The
second lesson that has been learned from previous work is that people may also be
influenced by a variety of circumstances surrounding the act of choice that are not
directly payoff-relevant. These circumstances may include aspects like the features of
foregone payoff distributions, the procedure by which an outcome is reached and the
beliefs that people hold about the intentions behind others’ choices. Our design allows
us to study the relevance of these different forces at the individual level.
We present a regression analysis of behavior based on the individual data. Our
results show that reciprocity linked to menu-dependence is never significant in our
data. We also find that subjects are influenced by the price of sacrificing money and
by whether they choose from a strong or from a weak position.
We then use our data to study individual behavior more formally. Previous research
has identified several possible specifications of social preferences models.3 These
different specifications can be nicely embedded in the general model presented in
Charness and Rabin (2002). In particular, the model includes a parameter that captures
reactions to positive and negative actions. On the basis of thismodelwe use our data for
a mixture-of-types model estimation. Our results exhibit considerable heterogeneity
of types. We find a large fraction of selfish subjects. We also find that social-welfare
maximizers are more frequent than inequity-averse subjects. None of the preference
types that emerge involve a significant value of the parameter related to positive or
negative actions.
2 Experimental setting
There are two subject roles denoted 1 and 2. Each player 1, the dictator, makes sixty
six binary dictator choices between A and B.
The sixty six dictator choices can be classified into six regimes based on relative
position and the recipient’s previous choice. In the first two regimes, the dictator
chooses from twodifferent relative positions, strong andweak, without the intervention
of the other player. In the strong position, the dictator’s payoff is at least as large as
2 Note that in our experiment all payoffs are deterministic and luck plays no role. Becker (2013) is a recent
example of how different types of luck change distributional preferences.
3 See Cooper and Kagel (2011) for a recent survey of the experimental literature on other-regarding pref-
erences.
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Table 1 Choice tasks involving a dictator with a strong position
Choice task Choice A Choice B Return on
sacrificing
Critical ρ if indifference
between A and B when q = 0
1 (1100, 600) vs. (1000,1000) 4 0.20
2 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 900) 3 0.25
3 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 800) 2 0.33
4 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 700) 1 0.50
5 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 600) 0 1
6 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 500) −1 –
7 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 400) −2 −1
8 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 300) −3 −0.50
9 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 200) −4 −0.33
10 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 100) −5 −0.25
11 (1100, 600) vs. (1000, 0) −6 −0.20
the passive player’s payoff. In contrast, in the weak position, the dictator’s payoffs
never exceed the recipient’s payoffs. We designed these two environments, motivated
by the previous evidence that pointed to the relevance of relative position.
Table 1 shows the specific alternatives from a strong position. Subjects in the player
1 role had to make eleven choices between A and each of the B-choices. Each binary
choice between A and B involves a return on sacrificing, shown in the fourth column
of the table.4 This variation in return across choices allows us to determine the extent
to which people sacrifice their own material payoffs to increase or to decrease other
people’s payoffs. Consider an example. The binary choice between state A and Bin
choice task 1 consists of player 1 deciding whether to forego 100 units to raise the
other subject’s payoff by 400 units, so that for player 1 the price of each payoff unit
given to player 2 is .25. The number in the fourth column of Table 1 will be used in
our figures to refer to the different Bs.
The selection of payoffs in Table 1 responds to the following considerations. Since
we want to place player 1 in a strong position, player 1’s payoff can be no smaller
than that of player 2 in any of the possible outcomes. The relation between payoffs at
A and those at any of the B cases has to be such that player 1 gives up a part of his
payoff and alters that of player 2; player 1 pays a price for changing player 2’s payoff.
We also wanted to give player 1 both the possibility of increasing and decreasing the
other player’s payoff. In this we were guided by the already abundant evidence which
shows that many people are willing to act in this manner.5 All these considerations
impose that player 1’s payoff in all the B-choices has to be smaller than 1100 and that
4 The returns on sacrificing are given by the player 2’s gain from switching from option A to a particular
option B divided by the player 1’s loss from choosing any B (always 100).
5 Zizzo and Oswald (2001) report results from an experiment in which they vary the price of burning
money, i.e. the amount of their own money that subjects must give up to decrease other people’s money
holdings. They found that nearly two-thirds of subjects paid for impoverishing other people. Even as the
price of burning went up, the percentage of people who chose to burn other people did not fall substantially.
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Table 2 Choice tasks involving a dictator with a weak position
Choice task Choice A Choice B Return on
sacrificing
Critical σ if indifference
between A and B when q = 0
12 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 1500) 4 0.20
13 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 1400) 3 0.25
14 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 1300) 2 0.33
15 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 1200) 1 0.50
16 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 1100) 0 1
17 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 1000) −1 –
18 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 900) −2 −1
19 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 800) −3 −0.50
20 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 700) −4 −0.33
21 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 600) −5 −0.25
22 (600, 1100) vs. (500, 500) −6 −0.20
player 2’s payoff in these states has to vary in a way that implies different positive
and negative returns on sacrificing. Here is where we introduce a simplifying element
into the design by keeping player 1’s payoff always at a value of 1000 in the different
B choices and changing only player 2’s payoff. Given this choice, player 2’s payoff
in the situation most favorable to player 2, B1, can not be higher than 1000, since
otherwise player 1 would cease to be in the strong position. From here the other states
are derived by diminishing player 2’s payoff until we reach zero. Some of the positive
and negative returns have the same absolute value. This is not a necessary feature of the
design, but introduces some additional simplicity. As a final feature, note an additional
connection between Tables 1 and 2: total payoffs are the same for any particular row
of the two tables.
Table 2 shows the set of alternatives from a weak position for players in the dictator
role. Note first that here the payoffs in state A are just reversed with respect to what
they were for the case where choices are from a strong position. As before, when a
subject chooses state B over A in any of the first five binary choices, she is sacrificing
own material payoffs to help the other subject and when a subject chooses state B
over A in any of the last six binary choices, she is sacrificing own material payoffs to
hurt the other subject. The different B payoffs are chosen in such a way that player
1’s payoff loss is the same for all the B states and that the returns on sacrificing shown
in column 4 of Table 2 are the same as for the choices from a strong position. As in
Table 1, fourth column shows a number for each return which will be used as a label
in the graphical representations below.
The choices presented in Tables 1 and 2 are the baseline for the four remaining
environments we confront our subjects with. In these four so-called response games
player 2 first decides whether to accept an outside option or to let player 1 make a
set of binary choices as above. This kind of response games are used extensively in
Charness and Rabin (2002). Table 3 gives an overview of the four response games
we used. The names of the different games are meant to capture player 1’s payoff in
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relation to player 2. The letter “S” stands for player 1’s strong position and the letter
“W” for her weak position, as used above. The labels “PR” and “NR” refer to positive
and negative reciprocity. We use these terms here in a descriptive way6 to refer to the
fact that for “PR” (“NR”) player 1 obtains less (more) at the outside option than at any
of the choices between A and B, and that player 1 may react favorably (unfavorably)
to this fact. The responsibility associated with others’ choices can influence people’s
rankings over narrowly defined outcomes and, in our context, this pertains to the
available outside option.
If in the SPR response game player 2 gives up his outside option she allows player
1 to obtain either 1000 or 1100, in both cases substantially more than the 0 payoff
that he would have obtained at the outside option. Observe that at the outside option
player 2 obtains a payoff of 1000, so that by passing up that outside option player
2 exposes herself considerably, since 1000 is the most player 2 can get from player
1’s choices. The fact that player 2 has nothing to gain in terms of own payoff from
foregoing the outside option, makes this an environment favorable to the emergence
of positive reciprocity. Specifically, if player 2 allows player 1 to effectively play, then
player 1 can be expected to be more generous towards player 2 than in the absence of
the (0, 1000) outside option. For the SNR game one can make a similar argument; by
not taking the outside option, player 2 imposes a large loss on player 1 while player
2 can still obtain the same—or a similar—payoff than at the outside option. As a
consequence, if player 1 is called to play he can be expected to be less generous than
in the absence of the (2000, 1000) outside option.
For the two response games involving the weak position one can say something
rather analogous. Player 1’s payoff at the outside option of gameWPR (WNR) is with
0 (2000) lower (higher) than any of the two payoffs that he can obtain if player 2
foregoes the outside option. Player 2’s payoff is equal to the highest possible payoff
that can arise if she gives player 1 the opportunity to choose.7
In summary, our data consist of individual choices for what can be seen as 22 differ-
ent budget set segments, involving both positive and negative relative prices, for three
cases (the distributional treatment and the two variations of the reciprocity treatment)
which differ with respect to the overall menu available to the players involved.
Our design makes it possible to collect very rich data about individual behavior
including data about reciprocity. In the next section we explain how our data can be
used in relation to various models of social preferences.
6 This is also related to what Sen (1997) called ‘menu-dependence’. This term refers to the fact that
preferences over an outcome may depend on the payoffs at other possible but unreached outcomes. Menu-
dependence is not the only aspect of the circumstances around the actual choice set that may have a bearing
on how people decide. Sen (1997) refers also to ‘chooser-dependence’: A person’s evaluation of an outcome
may depend on the identity or some characteristics of the chooser, i.e. the decision-maker that led to that
outcome. The results in Blount (1995) and Charness (2004) are examples of what can be interpreted in
terms of chooser-dependence.
7 In the WPR game, player 1’s payoff loss at the outside option is smaller than in the SPR game, so that
player 2’s decision to forego the outside option could be considered less kind inWPR than in SPR. However,
at the same time, player 2’s payoff is larger at the WPR outside option than at the SPR one, so that player 1
is “more behind” in the latter case and this element may also affect the way in which the foregoing of the
outside option is judged. Something similar can be said about the comparison of the SNR andWNR games.
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Table 3 Response games
Game SPR Player 2 chooses (0,1000) or lets player 1 make the choices in Table 1
Game WPR Player 2 chooses (0,1500) or lets player 1 make the choices in Table 2
Game SNR Player 2 chooses (2000,1000) or lets player 1 make choices in Table 1
Game WNR Player 2 chooses (2000,1500) or lets player 1 make choices in Table 2
3 Theoretical background
In this section we briefly discuss the kinds of social preferences that can be poten-
tially relevant in our context. Among the models designed to capture other-regarding
preferences two prominent classes can be distinguished: models that only take into
account distributional concerns, and models that include other motivational forces.
Charness and Rabin (2002) present a simple conceptual model of social preferences
in two-person games which embed the different models of preferences in terms of
different parameter ranges. Letting x1 and x2 be player 1’s and player 2’s monetary
payoffs, the Charness-Rabin utility function of player 1 for choosing action k (A or
B) can be written as:
U1k (x1k, x2k) ≡ (1 − ρ r − σ s − θ q)x1k + (ρ r + σ s + θ q)x2k (1)
where x1k and x2k are the payoffs to player 1 and player 2 associated with the action
k.
r = 1 if x1 > x2, and r = 0 otherwise;
s = 1 if x1 < x2, and s = 0 otherwise;
q= −1 if player 2 selected an action thatmade player 1worse off, and q= 0 otherwise.
In words, player 1’s utility is a weighted sum of her ownmonetary payoff and player
2’smonetary payoff, where theweight player 1 places on player 2’s payoffmay depend
on whether player 2 is getting a higher or lower payoff than player 1 and on how player
1 has behaved. The parameters ρ, σ and θ capture various aspects of other-regarding
preferences and reciprocal behavior; in all purely distributional models θ = 0. In the
Charness-Rabin formulation, the reciprocity element is conceived to only come into
play negatively, but one can modify this simply by considering that q = +1 if player 2
has previously behaved in a way that did not hurt player 1. In our case misbehavior or
favorable behavior can come into play throughmenu-dependence, as explained below.
Assuming that each subject maximizes the utility function indicated in Eq. (1),
we can obtain information about the parameter values of the utility function through
choices between A and B. For instance, if in the choice task 1 (see Table 1), player 1
is indifferent between A and B, we can assume that for this player U1A(x1A, x2A) ≡
(1 − ρ)1000 + ρ 600 = (1 − ρ)1000 + ρ 1000 ≡ U1B(x1B, x2B). This equality holds
if and only if the parameter ρ = 0.2. Consequently, if B is preferred to A then we
assume that this player has a parameter ρ > 0.2 and vice versa. Following with this
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example, if player 1 prefers B in the first two choice tasks and A in the following ones,
then we can assume that this player has a parameter value between 0.25 < ρ < 0.33.
The last column of Table 1 shows the critical value of ρ that would result in player 1
being indifferent between A and B. Any value of ρ below that number would result
in a choice of A for tasks 1–5; any value above that number would result in a choice
of A for tasks 7–11. The same analysis applies for the parameter σ in Table 2. The
critical value of σ is shown in the last column of Table 2.8
Charness and Rabin (2002) discuss three types of simple distributional preferences:
The first is the competitive preference type. A player of this type would be willing to
sacrifice some of his ownmonetary payoff to lower the payoff of the other player. Thus,
his utility weight on the monetary payoff of the other player is negative, σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0.
It is apparent from that last column that for choice tasks 1–5, a competitive player
would never choose B. This is because a choice of B would lower his own payoff
while at same time increase the other person’s payoff relative to choice A. This may
be consistent with a positive weight on the other person’s monetary payoff, but not
with a negative weight as required by competitive preferences. Similarly, a player
consistent with competitive preferences would choose B over A for some of decision
tasks 7–11. Indeed, if we observe the switching point from A to B in Table 1, we can
narrowly identify the range of values for ρ consistent with that switching point. The
same analysis applies to the value of σ in Table 2. The switching point from A to B
can narrowly define the range of values for σ consistent with that switching point in
Table 2. Any observed choices of A in decision tasks 12–16 are inconsistent with a
negative value of σ and thus inconsistent with competitive preferences.
A second prominent class of distributional preferences involves difference aversion,
as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).9 Difference aversion implies σ < 0 < ρ < 1.
As we just discussed, the switching points from A to B in Tables 1 and 2 allow us to
identify ranges of values for ρ and σ that are consistent with such choices. If these
ranges of values are consistent with negative σ and positive ρ, then we can say that
the decision maker has a difference aversion preference. There are choices that would
be entirely inconsistent with difference aversion. For example, a preference of B over
A in decisions 7–11 would be inconsistent with difference aversion because it would
imply sacrificing own payoff to hurt a disadvantaged partner. A preference for A over
B in decisions 12–16 is also inconsistent with difference aversion (and as discussed
above is also inconsistent with competitive preferences) because it implies sacrificing
own payoff to help an advantaged partner.
The third additional type that Charness and Rabin (2002) discuss is a social-welfare
preference, where 0 < σ ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Such preferences mean that player 1 will never
choose to reduce his own monetary payoff (by choosing B) in order to hurt the other
person. Thus, choices of B can be ruled out for decision tasks 6–11 and 17–22 for
participants who have social welfare preferences. Depending on the magnitude of
ρ and σ, some choices of A may be observed and if they are observed, they allow
the researcher to define a narrow range of possible values for σ and ρ. Note that the
8 In choice tasks 6 and 17, player 1 will prefer A over B for any paremeter values of ρ and σ.
9 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) present a related model. For some survey evidence on the importance of
relative position see Solnick and Hemenway (1998).
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perfect substitutes preferences of Andreoni and Miller (2002) are a special case of
social-welfare preferences. In the more general version they are sensitive to relative
position and to the return on sacrificing.
4 Experimental procedure
The experiment took place in a major European university. A total of 80 participants
in player 1 role made 66 decisions each. 79 of these participants provided usable data.
The experiment also involved 160 participants in player 2 roles as explained below.
The experiment consisted of two parts which we call treatments: the distributional
treatment (DT, hereafter), involving the choice situations presented in Tables 1 and
2, and the reciprocity treatment (RT, hereafter), involving the four response games
presented in Table 3. The experiment began with 80 subjects in player 1 role and 80
passive subjects in player 2 role in two separate rooms. At the end of the distributional
treatment, the same 80 subjects in player 1 role were asked, following a surprise
restart, to participate in the reciprocity treatment (they received no information about
the second treatment at the beginning of the first one) with a fresh group of 80 subjects
in player 2 role.
Participants kept their roles during the whole treatment and did not have any addi-
tional information except the individual payoffs described by the statesA andB. Player
1made 22 choices between two alternative states, A andB, corresponding to the strong
and the weak positions.
The type of design we used raises the issue of possible order effects. To take such
effects into account we collected data using four different orderings of our six decision
environments. These orderings are shown in Table 4, together with the corresponding
orderings of active subjects. Our next section shows that there was no significant effect
of the order on our results and briefly elaborates on this.
Subjects first made choices in one of the two environments of the distributional
treatment. They received a registration sheet for all eleven choices. Then the decisions
appeared in a fixed order on an overhead projector. Subjects were prompted to make
their decisions in this order, but they could change any of the decisions at any point.
At the end of the eleven choices they were asked to go over their decisions and were
told that they could make any changes they wished to make. Things then proceeded in
the same way for the second environment of the distributional treatment. We believe
that, given that subjects had to make somany decisions, the randomization of the order
would have introduced additional noise.
The subjects in player 2 role did not make any kind of decision. All participants
in this role knew that they would be paid according to the outcome generated by one
of the 22 choices of the corresponding player 1 and that they would be anonymously
paired with another participant of the other room, both—outcome and partner—to be
selected at random.
In the experiment, 1000 units of lab money = 5 euro. The hand-run treatment took
less than 30minutes and average earnings (included a 3 euro show-up fee) were around
10 euro. Experimental instructions are provided in Appendix 1. To make sure subjects
understood the instructions we had them answer a questionnaire after the instructions
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Table 4 Ordering of the six different environments
Number of subjects
(with active role)
Distributional treatment Reciprocity treatmenta
20 STRONG WEAK SPR WPR SNR WNR
20 STRONG WEAK SNR WNR SPR WPR
21 WEAK STRONG WPR SPR WNR SNR
19 WEAK STRONG WNR SNR WPR SPR
a W stands for weak position, S stands for strong position. PR stands for positive reciprocity, NR stands for
negative reciprocity
had been read aloud to the group and just before the experiment began. Nobody made
any mistakes.
A total of 160 subjects took part in reciprocity treatment: 80 in the first-mover role
of player 2 and 80 in second-mover role of player 1.10 Again, each group was seated
in one of two different rooms. As already mentioned, this treatment was run just after
the DT and the subjects in player 1 role were the same subjects in both treatments
while the player 2 subjects were different.
In this treatment involving the four response games we applied what is called the
strategy elicitation method, which goes back to Selten (1967). The player 1 subjects
made their pair-wise choices between two states conditional on the corresponding
player 2 letting them choose. In making these decisions, the player 1 subjects knew
that their decisions only mattered if the corresponding player 2 subjects had passed up
the outside option.11 In this treatment the player 1 subjects in the second-mover role
made a total 44 sequential choices, distributed in 4 blocks of 11 decisions, between two
alternative states, A and B. The player 2 subjects (first-mover role) made 4 choices,
one for each response game shown in Table 3, between two possibilities: to choose
the outside option or to let player 1 choose.
All participants knew that they would be anonymously paired with another par-
ticipant of the other room, and that they would be paid according to the outcome
generated by themselves in one of the 4 blocks, both—outcome and payoffs—to be
selected at random. To make sure subjects understood the RT we had them answer a
questionnaire after the instructions were read aloud to the group and just before the
experiment began. Again, the explanation was repeated until nobody made a mistake
(in this case, this was true almost from the beginning).
5 Results
Our statistical analysis consists of three parts. We first present a descriptive overview
of our results. Second, we discuss individual level analysis to understand the impact of
the different design variables on the decision to sacrifice own payoff. In this analysis
10 A player 1 left the experimental room once the distributional treatment finished. When we asked him to
participate in a new treatment, he refused. Hence, we have complete data from 80 subjects.
11 On the use of this method see Brandts and Charness (2000, 2011).
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we include variables to control for a number of design features, e.g., order and time
effects. Third, we attempt to uncover utility parameters of the decision parameters
as well as characterize individual-level heterogeneity in these parameters. To that
end, we present a mixture-model of the distribution of social preferences types in our
population, together with an estimation of the preference parameters for each of the
types.12
5.1 Aggregate level analysis
In this section the effects of different returns on sacrificing on subjects’ choices are
examined. As mentioned earlier, each binary choice implies a different return on
sacrifice; namely, a different impact on the other’s payoff for the same amount of
sacrifice (one hundred units) of own material payoffs. The set of these returns is the
same for the six choice environments that subjects in the player 1role find themselves
in. Figure 1 shows aggregate data about the effects of the return on sacrificing, as
represented by the percentage of subjects that choose B over A, aggregated over all
subjects and all six choice environments.
As Fig. 1 shows, in the aggregate individuals are to a considerable extent willing
to sacrifice money to alter the other’s payoff, both positively and negatively. In both
cases this aggregate willingness depends on what can be considered the natural way
on the return on sacrificing money. If one views positive and negative returns with
the same absolute value in a symmetric way, then one can state that, in the aggregate,
people are more willing to give up money to help than to hurt the other.
We next look at how the effects of the return on sacrificing depend on the influence
of reciprocity. Figure 2 shows player 1’s aggregate behavior in the reciprocity treat-
ment (PR and NR) together with the behavior, given the same binary choices, in the
distributional treatment where player 2 had no option at all. The general features of
the effects are the same for all three cases (DT, NR, PR). There are some differences,
12 We do no study the behavior of player 2 in the response game, since it involves both motivational and
strategic aspects and in this paper we are only interested in the former.
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Fig. 3 Return on sacrificing. Strong versus weak. Positive reciprocity treatment
but they appear to be rather secondary ones. For negative returns the differences do
not seem to follow any clear pattern. For the four cases of binary choices with positive
returns there is a common order of the percentages which are highest for the PR case,
intermediate for the NR case and lowest for the DT case. However, note that this is
not the pattern that would be consistent with a reciprocity interpretation of our results,
which would demand that the percentage of B choices would be lowest for NR, inter-
mediate for DT and highest for PR. At any rate, observe that the differences between
the cases are considerably smaller than the respective lowest percentage, a baseline,
so that they may not show up as significant in the statistical analysis we present below.
Figures 3 and 4 show the data disaggregated by position. Again, there are some
differences but they do not amount to any very clear pattern and it remains to be
seen whether they have any statistical validity. This means that the weak evidence
for reciprocity that the data presentation of Fig. 3 suggests is not hiding an important
interaction effect with the position.
5.2 Individual-level sensitivity to the task
Weare interested in the factors that lead player 1 to sacrifice his ownmonetary payoff—
a choice of B. The underlying assumption is that any sacrifice of one’s own monetary
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Fig. 4 Return on sacrificing. Strong versus weak. Negative reciprocity treatment
payoff is driven by social preferences, and the ultimate goal of the investigation is to
characterize these preferences. The previous section showed the sensitivity of aggre-
gate choices to the design variables. In this section, we report the individual-level
regression corresponding to the relationship between the choice of B and the design
variables.
The dependent variable is the decision of player 1 in round t (for t = 1,…, 66).13
The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if player 1 sacrificed his own payoff by
choosing B. It is 0 otherwise.
To capture individual differences in responsiveness to design variables, we conduct
a panel data random effects probit regression which assumes that the heterogeneity
can be captured through the constant parameter in the utility function.14 The constant
parameter is assumed to differ from subject to subject and distributed normally over
subjects.
With respect to the independent variables we first describe those that capture the
fundamental forces we are interested in analyzing and then move to those that capture
potentially important features of our design.
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, our design involves both positive and negative returns.
Hence, there are two aspects to player 1 choosing a particular option B: the magnitude
of the change in player 2’s payoff and the sign of that change. Table 5 shows the
results of a random effects Probit estimation. To capture the fact that positive and
negative returns correspond to fundamentally different circumstances we introduce
the variable Sacrifice which captures the sign of the change; it takes the value of 1
when the return on sacrifice is positive and 0 otherwise. Positive Return and Negative
Return are the returns on sacrificing in absolute terms when returns are positive and
negative respectively.
Position is a dummyvariable that takes the value of 1 for all decisionsmade from the
weak position (and 0 otherwise). Positive Reciprocity is a dummy variable set equal to
13 The 66 rounds correspond to the 11 choices in the six different environments.
14 In the next section, where we investigate the utility function specification, we are able to divide the
players into segments with different sets of preferences. Here, we do not do so and instead opt for random
effects because in the absence of a utility specification there is no meaningful economic interpretation to
different segments.
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Table 5 Random-effects probit
estimation
Data All
Constant −2.160***
(0.232)
Round −0.001
(0.001)
Order pos 0.321
(0.249)
Order reciprocity −0.229
(0.249)
Sacrifice 0.395***
(0.123)
Positive return 0.313***
(0.034)
Negative return 0.198***
(0.017)
Position −0.151***
(0.049)
Positive reciprocity −0.021
(0.081)
Negative reciprocity 0.052
(0.072)
Number of obs 5214 (79 subjects at
66 obs per subject)
Log likelihood −1858.19
1 for decisions in which the first mover took a positive action and the decision maker
is able to positively reciprocate that action (positive return on sacrificing). Negative
Reciprocity is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for decisions in which the first mover
took a negative action and the decision maker is able to negatively reciprocate that
action (negative return on sacrificing).
We now describe our procedural variables. Order effects are captured in two differ-
ent ways. Order Position (Order Reciprocity) is a dummy variable which controls for
one of the order effects and takes the value of 1 for the subjects that first play blocks
from the Strong Position (blocks with Positive Reciprocity) and zero otherwise. Going
back to the four sequences shown in Table 4, for the first row both Order Position and
Order Reciprocity have a value of 1, while for the second to fourth rows the values of
Order Position and Order Reciprocity are 1 and 0, 0 and 1 and 0 and 0, respectively.
Round refers to the order in the sequence, from 1 to 11, in which the binary decisions
were made. Table 5 shows the results of our estimation using the entire data set.
The results shown in Table 5 strongly suggest that observed behavior does not
depend on the variables we included to control for some of the procedural details of
our design. Round, Order Position and Order Reciprocity are insignificant. The order
in which subjects make decisions within each block and the order of the treatments
has no apparent effect on behavior.
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The results of Table 5 show that subjects strongly react to the nature (helping or
hurting) and the returns on their decisions. Their willingness to sacrifice significantly
increases whenever they can help others with their sacrifice as Sacrifice is positive and
strongly significant.
Subjects are shown to be responsive to the returns on their decisions. When the
positive impact on others from choosing B (positive return) rises, subjects are more
likely to help others. When their negative impact on others from choosing B rises
(negative return) they are more likely to hurt others. The slope on the negative return
is flatter, suggesting that responsiveness to negative impact is lower. Note that the
propensity to hurt others when the negative impact rises should be considered together
with the positive coefficient on sacrifice. That is, overall, subjects are far less likely to
sacrifice their own payoff for the purpose of hurting others than they are to sacrifice
their own payoff for the purpose of helping others. However, conditional on choosing
to hurt others, they are more likely to do so when the impact of their action relative to
their sacrifice is larger.
Note also that the probability of choosing B is significantly altered when comparing
decisions made from the weak and the strong position in all cases. Position is negative
and significant. This means that subjects are willing to sacrifice more when they make
decisions from a position of strength (their earnings are above the payoff of the other
player) than from a weak position.
In contrast, reciprocity does not affect the probability of sacrificing. Posi-
tive/Negative Reciprocity, have no significant effect.
The estimates clearly confirm the informal impression given by the aggregate data
shown above. Return, sacrifice and relative position treatment effects are highly sig-
nificant and have the expected sign, while the reciprocity variables are not significant.
We now know that overall reciprocity (related tomenu-dependence) does notmatter
and that the relative price and the position do matter. However, we have not yet identi-
fied more precisely what type of preference models the different individuals’ behavior
are consistent with. The only way to find out about this is to look more closely at
the individual level data. In the next section we present the results of mixturemodel
estimation.
5.3 Estimating utility functions
In the previous section, we reported a random effects regression whose purpose was to
characterize the relationship between design variables and choice. In that analysis, we
handled heterogeneity through a continuous random effects specification because dis-
cretizing the parameter space would have had no natural interpretation in the absence
of utility specification.
Once a utility function has been specified, one can postulate different types of
behavior corresponding to different parts of the utility parameter space. The mixture
model is an ideal approach to identify subpopulations of types with different social
preferences (e.g., Iriberri and Rey-Biel 2013; Cappelen et al. 2007; Conte and Moffatt
2010). Table 6 shows the results of our mixture-model estimation and Appendix 2
contains details of the estimation.
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Table 6 Mixture model estimation, n = 5214 (79 subjects; 66 obs per subject)
Term 2-segments 3 segments 4 segments 5 segments
% Selfish 0.446* 0.432* 0.405*
% Zero intelligence 0.304* 0.278* 0.085* 0.113*
%Social-welfare
maximizers
0.696* 0.275* 0.277* 0.277*
% Inequality-averse 0.116*
% Competitive 0.206* 0.089*
ρ 1 0.191* 0.347* 0.345* 0.342* Social welfare
maximizers
σ 1 0.142* 0.267* 0.267* 0.268*
θ 1 −0.0005 −0.041 −0.04 −0.039
Constant1 100 100 100 100
ρ 2 0.243* Inequity aversion
σ 2 −0.351*
θ 2 0.032
Constant2 100
ρ 3 −0.166* −0.536* Competitiveness
σ 3 −0.617* −0.466*
θ 3 −0.007 −0.025
Constant3 100 100
Epsilon 0.371* 0.030* 0.027* 0.020* Selfish
Log likelihood −2007 −1819 −1649 −1574
# of parameters 6 7 12 17
AIC 4026 3652 3322 3182
BIC 4065 3698 3401 3294
* Significant at 5 % level
The upper part of the table shows the distribution of types and the lower part the
parameter estimates for the different types. In our estimation we impose the existence
of a selfish type as well as of a zero-intelligence who chooses all actions with equal
probabilities, but we do not impose any restrictions on the parameters of the types with
social preferences. All types with the corresponding specific values of the parameters
emerge endogenously.
We assess the models with 2–5 segments on log likelihood, AIC, and BIC.15 We
find that the five-segment model performs best on all three measures.
Focusing on the results for the model with five segments, we start with the fractions
for the two restricted types. The zero-intelligence or noisy traders amount to only
11.3 %. This means that we are able to classify16 almost 90 % of our subjects into
15 AIC stands for Akaike Information Criterion and is defined as AI C = −2Loglikelihood + 2k. BIC
stands for Bayesian Information Criterion and is defined as B I C = −2LogLikelihood + kln(n). For both
criteria, lower values are preferred to higher values.
16 The proportions of subjects from each type are generated as estimates of the mixture model, without the
need to classify any individual subjects. Nevertheless, individual subjects can indeed be classified and this
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preference-based types. We can see that the selfish type, σ = 0 and ρ = 0, is the most
frequent one with 40.5 % of the subjects.
The next more frequent type—the first endogenously emerged one— is the social-
welfare maximizer, since the estimated parameter values satisfy 0 < σ ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Note
that both σ and ρ are significantly different form zero, with ρ being significantly larger
than σ (restricting the two to be equal yields LL = 1578.7 versus 1573.9, Likelihood
Ratio test statistic= 4.8 × 2 = 9.6, distributed Chi-square with 1 d.f, yielding p-
value< 0.01). θ is insignificant. The social-welfare maximizer type covers 27.7 % of
subjects and is the most frequent social preferences type.
There are two other social preferences types emerging from the data. Inequity-
averse subjects, characterized by σ < 0 < ρ < 1, account for 11.6 % of participants
and competitive subjects cover 8.9%. In both cases the estimates satisfy the theoretical
restriction. For the inequity-averse type ρ is positive and significantly larger than the
negative coefficient for σ. For the competitive type, ρ and σ are negative and not
significantly different from each other (LR test statistic = (1574.4− 1573.9) ∗ 2 = 1,
chi-square d.f.=1, p value = 0.32).
We now look more carefully at the estimated parameter values. Note first that,
that all estimated parameter configurations involve an insignificant estimate of θ. This
is consistent with the results from the random effects estimation discussed earlier.
Menu-dependent reciprocity is absent from our data.
All the other parameter value estimates of the different types are consistent with
the theoretical discussion in Sect. 3. Social-welfare maximizers do trade-off their
own payoff with that of the other, but assign higher weight to selfish-payoff than
to the other’s payoff– in contrast to what pure substitution would imply (a regression
with rho1 fixed at 0.5 yields a LL = 1596.6 which by the chi squared test gives a p
value< 0.01) and more so if behind in payoff.
The parameter for the inequality-averse type exhibits a larger absolute aversion to
beingbehind than tobeing ahead.Theparameter values forwhatwecall the competitive
type equally competitive being ahead or behind.
6 Discussion and conclusions
We present a new experimental design that uses dictator games with a manipulation
of the relative position of the dictator and the prior action by the recipient to gen-
erates information that directly pertains to individuals’ social preferences. Dictator
games remain the workhorse in experimental economics for mapping social prefer-
ences (though challenges have been raised17). In that respect our design provides both
Footnote 16 continued
classification roughly matches the proportions estimated. Individual classification is done on the posteriors.
A subject is classified as a particular type if the posterior probability of him belonging to that type is higher
than the corresponding probability of him belonging to any other type of the types specified.
17 List (2007) shows that changing the framing of the dictator game results in different behavior. Based
on these results, he challenges the notion that dictator games reveal social preferences on the grounds that
social norms present a major confound. Cooper and Kagel (2011) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide
similar questions of robustness in dictator games and review challenges.
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the ability to derive more precise identification of parameter values and the ability to
separate out competing explanations for dictator game behavior,
Our data present the following patterns: First, a large portion of observed behav-
ior cannot be understood in purely individualistic terms since subjects’ behavior is
sensitive to the cost of helping and hurting others. Second, we find strong evidence
that the weight on others’ payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is in an
advantageous or disadvantageous position.
Third, it is noteworthy that we find no evidence of reciprocity in the data. Reci-
procity remains one of the most elusive preferences to demonstrate conclusively in
the laboratory and existing evidence for reciprocity is quite mixed. Brandts and Solà
(2001), Falk et al. (2003) and Cox (2004; see Cox et al. 2008 for axiomatic character-
ization of the data) find favorable evidence for reciprocity, while Charness and Rabin
(2002) Bolton et al. (1998), Bolton et al. (2000) and Cox and Deck (2005) do not find
it. In games such as the ultimatum and trust games which have been thought to con-
clusively demonstrate negative and positive reciprocity, respectively, the reciprocity
explanation and its robustness are increasingly challenged.18
Given the many explanations proposed in the literature, we can only conjecture
on why it reciprocity is not showing in our data. One possible conjecture is called
the “complicity effect” (Charness and Rabin 2002), which loosely means that the
mere action by player 2 alleviates the responsibility player 1 takes for the outcome.
In our setting, Player 2 subjects who opted to give player 1 the choice gave up in
potential payoff far greater than any payoff they could possibly earn by giving player
1 the choice. Thus, player 1 could surmise that player 2 values the monetary payoff
to player 1 a great deal. This in turn may justify a more selfish action on the part of
player 1.
Another possible explanation may pertain to the response-elicitation method. It
is possible that in certain environments direct elicitation invokes more reciprocal
response. That said, there is no consensus in the literature that there is a “right”
approach. Indeed, there are relevant economic situations in which decision makers
must form contingent strategies in advance. In addition, the survey of direct compar-
isons of the two elicitation methods contained in Brandts and Charness (2011) finds
that there are more studies that do not find a difference than studies that find one. In our
particular case, collecting the kind of individual data required with the direct response
method is not feasible. Specifically, using the direct elicitationmethodwould not allow
us to collect a complete decision set for every participant. Missing these important
parts of the reaction space would not permit the type of analysis we report here.
Our design makes it possible to go one step beyond in characterizing of individual
preferences by estimating the parameter values of their utility functions. The results
of our mixture-model estimation show that observed non-individualistic behavior is
very heterogeneous across individuals. As also stressed byAndreoni andMiller (2002)
people conform to more than one model of social preferences. In relation to the debate
18 The best known evidence on negative reciprocity comes from the ultimatum game. However, there is a
great deal of literature challenging the robustness of these results (Falk et al. 2003; Brandts and Solà 2001;
Stahl and Haruvy 2008). The interpretation of trust game results as evidence for positive reciprocity has
been challenged as well (e.g., Cox and Deck 2005).
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about what kind of other-regarding preferences aremore effective in explaining behav-
ior, our results are to some extent compatible with those in Charness and Rabin (2002).
They also concord partially with the findings of Engelmann and Strobel (2004), who
study social preferences in the context of three-person games and do not investigate
any issues related to reciprocity. Like them, we find that the influence of social wel-
fare preferences is stronger than that of inequality aversion. In our data social welfare
maximizers are not of the perfect substitutes type; subjects do give more weight to
own payoff than to that of others.
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Appendix 1: Instructions
Instructions distributional treatment
This is an experiment about decision making. You will be paid for participating, and
the amount of money you will earn depends on the decisions that you and the other
participants make. At the end of the experiment you will be paid privately and in cash
for your decisions. You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during
the course of the experiment.
In this experiment there are two types of subjects, x and y. As subject x will make
22 sequential choices in 2 blocks of 11 decisions between two alternative states (A
and B). Each decision is independent from each your other decisions. Your payoffs
in the experiment depend on your decisions. You will be anonymously paired with a
subject y.
As subject y will not make any kind of decision. You will be anonymously paired
with a subject x and your payoffs in the experiment depend on subject x’s choices.
Tomake decisions you only have to circle in the control sheet one of the two options
A and B in each round.
At the end of the experiment you will thus have 22 outcomes from the rounds
played, only one of these outcomes will be selected for payoffs.
Instructions reciprocity treatment
This is an experiment about decision making. You will be paid for participating, and
the amount of money you will earn depends on the decisions that you and the other
participants make. At the end of the experiment you will be paid privately and in cash
for your decisions. You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during
the course of the experiment.
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In this experiment there are two types of subjects, x and z. As subject x will make
44 sequential choices in 4 blocks of 11 decisions between two alternative states (A
and B). Each decision is independent from each your other decisions. You will be
anonymously paired with a subject z. As player x your decisions will only affect the
payoffs if player z opts to give you the choice.
As subject z will be anonymously paired with a subject x and will make 4 decisions,
one per block, between two possibilities: to choose or to let player x choose. The player
x knows that her decisions will only affect the payoffs if subject z opts to give her the
choice.
Tomake decisions you only have to circle in the control sheet one of the two options
in each block.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid according to the outcomes generated
by yourselves in the 4 blocks, only one of these outcomes will be selected for payoffs.
Appendix 2: Mixture model estimation
A utility-based behavioral type is defined by two equations. The first equation is a
utility function, generally of the form of Eq. (1), repeated below for convenience. The
second equation identifying a behavioral type maps the utilities of the different actions
in the game to a probability distribution over these actions. Of the five behavioral types
we discussed, the first three types correspond to the utility specification of equation
(1).
Uik ≡ (1 − ρ r − σ s − θ q) xik + (ρ r + σ s + θ q) xjk (1)
where xik and xjk are the payoffs to player 1 and player 2 associated with the action k.
Equation (1) can be alternatively expressed as
Uik ≡ x1k − (ρ r + σ s + θ q) (x1k − x2k) (1′)
The relevant construct for the probability mapping is the difference in utilities between
the two actions. This is computed as:
U1 ≡ x1 − (ρ r + σ s + θ q) (x1 − x2) (1′′)
where xi is the difference between player 1’s payoffs to choosing A and B, and
similarly for player 2. Note, however, that by design x1 = 100. Hence
U1 ≡ 100 + (ρ r + σ s + θ q) (x2 − 100) (1′′′)
The probability mapping from utility to choice is the logit:
Pr(ChoiceA) = exp
( 1
λ
UA
)
exp
( 1
λ
UA
) + exp( 1
λ
UB)
(2)
This equation adds a scaling parameter λ to the estimation.
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Before we proceed to discuss themixturemodel, a fewmore notes on the non-utility
based types. There are two types that are not utility-based. The first is the level-0 which
is a type that chooses both actions with equal probability of 0.5. Without this type, the
scaling parameter on the utility-based types tends to pick up noisy behavior, possibly
leading to erroneous inferences about utility weights. The second is the selfish type.
The selfish type is critical because it is the default type in economic theory. Errors by
the selfish type occur with probability epsilon, which is being estimated.
Mixture model estimation is based on the notion that there are discrete latent sub-
populations of players behaving in distinct ways. The method first requires estimating
a likelihood function for each player’s joint choices conditional on being of particular
typem. For each of the 79 players in the data, indexed i = 1,…, 79, there are 66 choices,
indexed by d = 1…66.
The likelihood for subject i’s combined 66 choices condition on being type m is
expressed as:
Lcondi,m = L(subject i’s joint choices | type m) =
66∏
d=1
P(choiceid |t ype m)
The unconditional likelihood for subject i’s combined 66 choices condition on being
type m can be computed as:
Luncondi = L(subject i′s joint choices) =
M∑
m=1
αm L
cond
i,m
The αm parameter is the unconditional probability of any player being of type m.
It can also be interpreted as the proportion of m type players in the population.
It is important to stress that the three utility-based types are ex-ante identical in
specification. The separation into type occurs in an unrestricted manner. That is, we
did not restrict the parameter space to the positive quadrant for the first type, etc. The
types simply emerged unrestricted from the data.
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